M. Dupréel est, avant tout, un moraliste et un sociologue, et sa théorie de la connaissance est, nettement, d'inspiration sociologique. En insérant les problèmes de la connaissance dans la trame de la vie sociale, en raisonnant sur une pensée complète, et non sur une pensée appauvrie et schématisée, M. Dupréel arrive à des conclusions qui sont souvent très proches de celles que le lecteur est habituéà lire dans Dialectica.Je fais précéder les extraits choisis d'indications bibliographiques qui concernent uniquement les travaux (...) dont ces fragments ont été tirés; il ne faudrait donc pas u voir la liste complète des œuvres de M. Dupréel. (shrink)

Cahier 1 : M. Vetö, Le passé selon Bergson ; F. Guibal, « E. Weil et nous ». Une philosophie à l’épreuve de la réalité ; O. Balaban, Intellectualisme et causalité chez Hegel, et les limites de la science moderne ; C. Poirel, Le matérialisme neuronal et la question de la transcendance ; B. D. Hercenberg, Le mythe de Déméter et la tension entre la séparation..

Comme un crislal se reconslitue à partir de l'une de ses parcelles, toute la philosophiw s'enyendre à partir de l'idée de dialectiqne ouverte, et porte, en elle, le même caractère dialectique.

Voici le texte de la circulaire que les organisateurs de cette manifestation viennent de lancer. Nous prions ceux de nos lecteurs qui désirent de plus amples renseignements de s'adresser aux secrétaires, MM. Ch. Perelman et A. De Waehens .Monsieur et cher collègue, La Société belge de philosophie et la Société philosophique de Louvain organisent de concert cette année, à Bruxelles et Louvain, le.

This collection contains studies on justice, juridical reasoning and argumenta tion which contributed to my ideas on the new rhetoric. My reflections on justice, from 1944 to the present day, have given rise to various studies. The ftrst of these was published in English as The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. The others, of which several are out of print or have never previously been published, are reunited in the present volume. As justice is, for me, the (...) prime example of a "confused notion", of a notion which, like many philosophical concepts, cannot be reduced to clarity without being distorted, one cannot treat it without recourse to the methods of reasoning analyzed by the new rhetoric. In actuality, these methods have long been put into practice by jurists. Legal reasoning is fertile ground for the study of argumentation: it is to the new rhetoric what mathematics is to formal logic and to the theory of demonstrative proof. It is important, then, that philosophers should not limit their methodologi cal studies to mathematics and the natural sciences. They must not neglect law in the search for practical reason. I hope that these essays lead to be a better understanding of how law can enrich philosophical thought. CH. P. (shrink)

Modern logic has Wldergone some remarkable developments in the last hun dred years. These have contributed to the extraordinary use of formal logic which has become essentially the concern of mathematicians. This has led to attempts to identify logic with formal logic. The claim has even been made that all non-formal reasoning, to the extent that it cannot be formalized, no longer belongs to logic. This conception leads to a genuine impoverishment of logic as well as to a narrow conception (...) of reason. It means that as soon as demonstrative proofs are no longer available reason will no longer dominate. Even the idea of the 'reasonable' becomes foreign to logic and such expres sions as 'reasonable decisions', 'reasonable choice' or 'reasonable hypotheses' would be put aside as meaningless. The domain of action, including method ology and everything that is given over to deliberation or controversy - i.e., foreign to formal logic - would become a battleground where necessarily the reason of the strongest would always prevail. (shrink)

The New Rhetoric is founded on the idea that since "argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced," says Chaïm Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, and they rely, in particular, for their theory of argumentation on the twin concepts of universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed to a specific individual or group, the orator decides what information and what approaches will (...) achieve the greatest adherence according to an ideal audience. This ideal, Perelman explains, can be embodied, for example, in God, in all reasonable and competent men, in the man deliberating or in an elite." Like particular audiences, then, the universal audience is never fixed or absolute but depends on the orator, the content and goals of the argument, and the particular audience to whom the argument is addressed. These considerations determine what information constitutes facts and reasonableness and thus help to determine the universal audience that, in turn, shapes the orator's approach. The adherence of an audience is also determined by the orator's use of values, a further key concept of the New Rhetoric. Perelman's treatment of value and his view of epideictic rhetoric sets his approach apart from that of the ancients and of Aristotle in particular. Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three genres-forensic, deliberative, and epideictic-is largely motivated by the judgments required for each: forensic or legal arguments require verdicts on past action, deliberative or political rhetoric seeks judgment on future action, and epideictic or ceremonial rhetoric concerns values associated with praise or blame and seeks no specific decisions. For Aristotle, the epideictic genre was of limited importance in the civic realm since it did not concern facts or policies. Perelman, in contrast, believes not only that epideictic rhetoric warrants more attention, but that the values normally limited to that genre are in fact central to all argumentation. Epideictic oratory, Perelman argues, has significant and important argumentation for strengthening the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds." These values are central to the persuasiveness of arguments in all rhetorical genres since the orator always attempts to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience.". (shrink)